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1 Introduction
Securities class actions (SCAs) often have significant ramifications for firms and the CEOs
involved. SCAs, under SEC Rule 10b-5, aim to compensate shareholders for economic losses
caused by a firm’s false statements. SCAs often harm companies’ product market positions
(Johnson et al., 2014; Karpoff et al., 2008) and their access to capital (Autore et al., 2014).
Given the high stakes, a natural question is whether some types of CEOs are less adept
than others in terms of averting SCAs. In particular, are there potentially observable CEO
characteristics that would imply a greater willingness to inflate their firm’s prospects, even
if it involved a distortion of facts? A finding that certain types of CEOs are more prone
to making erroneous statements and catalyzing a class action could be helpful in terms of
selecting new CEOs. Similarly, litigation insurers might wish to identify which executives are
riskier and warrant greater pricing scrutiny. We propose one such executive-characteristic:
overconfidence, which could induce executives to recklessly over-state their prospects or to
conceal negative information with a perceived belief that future performance would obviate
the economic loss that might otherwise trigger a class action.
Our objective is to better understand the implicit trade-offs – and beliefs – of CEOs and
other executives that could affect the likelihood of SCAs. We analyze the role played by
managers’ beliefs on litigation risk by focusing on overconfident executives. Our contention
is that these executives, with their bullish views about their firm’s future prospects, are more
likely to engage in manipulative actions. We develop and test hypotheses on the relation
between overconfident beliefs and the tendency to commit fraud of the type that leads to SCAs.
We also investigate whether SCAs prompt changes in firm policies by either precipitating the
CEO’s departure from the company or by inducing the existing management to improve
quality of disclosure. Evidence that SCAs promote disclosure speaks to the policy issue of
whether such class actions are welfare enhancing.
Overconfident executives have, by definition, an overly positive view of their ability and of
their companies’ prospects. This would manifest in overconfident executives’ making exces-
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sively optimistic public statements about the company, or failing to disclose negative infor-
mation in a timely manner – believing that they might be able to rectify this period of poor
performance. Indeed, this is the logic behind the commonly used media-based measures of
overconfidence (see e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2012). However, should those statements prove to
be falsely optimistic, the company risks becoming subject to a 10b-5 securities class action
(SCA) in which shareholders sue for loss or damage arising from reliance on such information
when purchasing company’s stock. Exacerbating the risk of a class action lawsuit is that ex-
cessive optimism with regard to future performance could leave executives with a nonchalant
attitude about shading their financial statements.
We analyze whether, and in what circumstances, overconfident CEOs and non-CEO execu-
tives expose their companies to SCAs. For our analysis, we use a firm-year panel dataset from
1996-2012. We identify SCA-events using the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse
(SCAC).1 We use option-based measures of overconfidence, focusing on the Holder67 mea-
sure (as in Malmendier et al., 2011), which classifies managers as overconfident if they refrain
from exercising deep in-the-money (specifically, 67% in-the-money) options. The underlying
rationale is that an executive’s human capital is often extremely under-diversified (exposed
to firm-specific risk). A rational, risk-averse executive would choose not to hold deep in the
money exercisable options: since he would be strictly better off by liquidating the options and
using the funds to create a diversified portfolio with a similar or better risk-return profile,
but less correlation with his firm-specific risk. We also use an alternative, “trading-based”
measure of overconfidence (as in Kolasinski and Li, 2013), that classifies CEOs as being over-
confident if they purchase stock in their own company and then lose money on the purchase.
Additional robustness tests are conducted using a news-based measure of overconfidence.
We first hypothesize and show that overconfident CEOs and executives expose their com-
panies to SCAs. We examine the role of CEO overconfidence within a regression framework
1In our baseline results, we focus on whether a SCA was filed against a company rather than whether it
was ultimately successful. This is because there are many possible reasons for a suit to fail, including owing
to the relative quality of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s lawyers and the resource-imbalance between the
parties in fighting the case. In robustness tests, we find qualitatively similar results when focusing on SCAs
that were not dismissed.
2
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similar to that in Kim and Skinner (2012). These regressions utilize industry and year fixed
effects, and control for other factors that might influence litigation risk. 2 Nonetheless, we also
check that the results hold when using firm fixed effects and different industry-definitions. 3
Our results indicate that overconfident CEOs’ firms are about 33% more likely to be subject to
a SCA than comparable other firms.4 Further, the overconfidence of senior executives (exclud-
ing CEO) increases the likelihood of a SCA in addition to the effect of CEO overconfidence.
This evidence is consistent with the idea that overconfident executives are also more likely
to expose their firms to a SCA by, for instance, making overly positive predictions about the
firm’s prospects that are not supported by facts.
Next we analyze the effect of exogenously mandated changes in corporate governance
practices in mitigating (or worsening) the impact of CEO overconfidence. We focus on the
impact of one such exogenous shock to governance: passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX) and contemporaneous changes to the NASDAQ/NYSE listing rules. We hypothesize
and show that the improved monitoring following the passage of SOX moderates the impact of
CEO overconfidence on SCAs. SOX requires firms to have a majority independent board, fully
independent audit and nomination committees, and obliges the CEO to personally sign-off on
the firm’s accounts. These changes would be expected to both improve corporate governance
standard and expose the CEO to a wider range of independent view-points (thereby helping
to moderate overconfident CEOs’ views).
To identify the effect of SOX, we distinguish between firms that were compliant with major
requirements of SOX prior to the passage of SOX, and firms that were not (i.e., non-compliant
firms). If additional scrutiny and independent view-points mandated by SOX help to reign
in overconfident senior executives, the passage of SOX should primarily affect firms that were
non-compliant at the time and have little/no effect on firms that were already compliant.
2We use both two digit Standard Industry Codes (SIC) and Hoberg-Phillips industry classification to control
for industry fixed effects. Hoberg-Phillips industry classification results are stated in Online Appendix.
3Requiring firm fixed effects significantly reduces the sample-size as many firms are sued only once or are
never sued. Consequently, the main reported regressions use industry and year effects.
4This result comes from the marginal effects associated with the coefficient on CEO Holder67 in Table 3
and average litigation risk of 4.5% for non-OC CEOs. The marginal effect associated with Holder67 in Table 3
is 1.54%, suggesting roughly about 1.54/4.5 ≈ 33% more risk for OC-managers relative to non-OC managers.
3
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Our empirical findings strongly support our conjecture: In the pre-SOX period, CEO
overconfidence has a substantial impact on litigation risk of SOX-non-compliant firms, but
does not affect the litigation risk of SOX-compliant firms. Similarly, in the post-SOX period,
non-compliant firms exhibit a significant drop in the effect of CEO overconfidence on firms’
litigation risk, whereas there is little change for compliant firms.
We assess whether overconfident CEOs, and companies, modify their behavior in response
to SCAs. We hypothesize and show that a SCA reduces the influence of CEO overconfidence
on future litigation-risk. We also find that post-SCA, these CEOs exhibit fewer indications
of being overconfident, relative to their pre-SCA behavior. This finding is consistent with the
results in Bernile et al. (2014) that CEOs that experienced extreme shocks in their youth (in
their case, natural disasters) were less prone to risk-taking behavior. Further analysis shows
that a firm that has been subject to a SCA under its prior CEO is less likely to hire an
overconfident executive for its next CEO. These results indicate the potential impact of SCAs
(and the threat thereof) in terms of affecting firm and CEO behavior.
We take steps to mitigate econometric concerns that might otherwise influence a study
of this type. These include (but are not limited to) the following. As stated, we exam-
ine the role of exogenous event like SOX in moderating the impact of CEO overconfidence.
We also undertake measures to address sample selection issues, including propensity score
matching techniques. Further, we ensure that the results are robust to alternative measures
of managerial overconfidence, including news-based measures (per Hirshleifer et al., 2012)
and trading-based measures (per Kolasinski and Li, 2013). The results are also robust to
“adjusting” the overconfidence measure for the firm’s stock-performance.
The results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we expand upon the prior
SCA-literature by highlighting the influence of executives’ behavioral characteristics (such as
CEO overconfidence) on the likelihood of a SCA. Second, we provide additional evidence on
the effect of SOX and corporate governance on the impact of CEO overconfidence and the
likelihood of SCAs. Third, our results suggest that shocks, such as SCAs, can induce CEO
4
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436264 
behavioral change: CEOs exhibit fewer indications of overconfidence
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 both discusses the prior literature
and presents the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and presents summary statistics.
Section 4 presents the multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship between
executive overconfidence and SCAs. Section 5 presents the robustness tests and addresses
alternative explanations for the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Hypotheses
A securities class action arises if the company, or an employee thereof, makes a materially
falsely positive statement (or omits negative information) and shareholders subsequently suffer
loss or damage by reason of relying on this misstatement. The shareholders typically do not
need to prove that they relied on the misstatement (as the court assumes that they relied
on the efficiency of the markets, which implicitly impounds all statements relating to the
company).5 Instead, it is generally sufficient for shareholders to prove that there is a false
statement and that they purchased the shares after such a false statement. Thus, a 10b-5
SCA typically arises after one of the company’s executives makes a positive statement that
the company fails to actualize, or presents a positive prediction that fails to materialize. The
plaintiff must also establish scienter, which is essentially that the defendant intentionally, or
recklessly, misled the market.6 The following sub-sections discuss the relationship between
overconfidence and the likelihood of a SCA.
5This presumption of reliance originated in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. In June 2014, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the validity of this presumption in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
6For a discussion of scienter requirements see for example Bolger (1980). While the courts initially required
the plaintiff to establish that the defendant intentionally mislead the market (i.e., by making a statement that
she knew to be false), since Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 425 U.S. 185 at 193 (1976), courts have accepted
that it is sufficient to establish that the defendant acted recklessly (Bolger, 1980; Donelson and Prentice, 2012;
Walker and Seymour, 1998). Further, Donelson and Prentice (2012) argue that PSLRA is premised on the
sufficiency of establishing scienter by showing the defendant CEO was reckless.
5
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2.1 Overconfidence and SCAs in general
We propose that overconfident executives are more likely to make such falsely positive state-
ments. This is for at least four reasons. First, as indicated, overconfident CEOs tend to over-
estimate projects’ returns and under-estimate projects’ risks. Additionally, as stated above, if
the CEO makes a falsely positive statement (i.e., when promoting the firm’s projects) and is
reckless as to whether that statement is correct, then the firm can be liable for a SCA. Since
making imprudently overconfident statements increases the chance of the CEO being found
to be reckless, we expect overconfident CEOs to increase the likelihood of a SCA. Indeed, a
track-record of overconfident behavior would help to establish a case that the CEO’s state-
ments were not merely ‘negligent’ (which would be insufficient to establish scienter), but were
reckless.7 We expect the above logic to apply similarly to overconfident non-CEO executives.
Second, overconfident CEOs tend to over-invest (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). How-
ever, such investments often perform poorly (Kolasinski and Li, 2013; Malmendier and Tate,
2008), whereupon overconfident managers tend to adopt less conservative accounting practices,
postpone loss recognition (Ahmed and Duellman, 2013), and engage in earnings smoothing
(Bouwman, 2014) and financial misstatements (Schrand and Zechman, 2012). Further, Laux
and Stocken (2012) present a theoretical model in which they argue that optimistic managers
are more likely to (potentially inadvertently) misrepresent their investment prospects. Relat-
edly, McTier and Wald (2011) indicate that over-investment (albeit, not necessarily involving
overconfident CEOs), tends to be associated with increased litigation-risk.
Third, overconfident CEOs tend to have miscalibrated perceptions of the risk and return
associated with investments (Ben-David et al., 2013). Thus, overconfident CEOs are more
likely to believe (incorrectly) that the company will perform well enough that they will not be
caught if they make financial misstatements, or even if they are caught, the firm’s stock price
will not decline such that shareholders suffer a loss and instigate a Rule 10b-5 suit. Such beliefs
7Courts have acknowledged that it is difficult to establish direct proof that the CEO intended to mislead
or was reckless (Clarke v. United States, 132 F.2d 538, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1943)). Instead, the court will
often determine scienter as “a matter of inference from circumstantial evidence” (Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983).).
6
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appear to prompt overconfident CEOs to produce less conservative accounting statements
(Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). Overconfident CEOs also appear to fail to learn from their
failure to meet such optimistic forecasts (Chen et al., Forthcoming). Thus, the overconfident
CEOs’ highly optimistic beliefs could result in recklessly optimistic representations as to the
firm’s future prospects.
Finally, overconfident CEOs are more likely to omit negative information than are non-
overconfident CEOs. A SCA can arise following the firm’s failure to disclose negative infor-
mation. An overconfident CEO, almost by definition, is more confident about her ability to
rectify such negative outcomes. Thus, they would be slower to recognize negative information,
giving rise to a SCA. The foregoing reasons suggest that overconfident CEOs are more likely to
make recklessly, or intentionally, falsely positive statements. Such actions, would then expose
the firm to a SCA. We expect a similar effect for non-CEO senior executives.
Hypothesis 1. Companies with overconfident CEOs are more likely to be subject to a secu-
rities class action.
Hypothesis 2. Companies with overconfident senior, non-CEO, executives are more likely to
be subject to a securities class action.
2.2 Governance
Improvements in internal governance should reduce the likelihood that an overconfident CEO’s
company is sued. Monitoring by independent directors can mitigate the likelihood of secu-
rities fraud in general (Choi et al., 2013; Khanna et al., 2013). Higher quality boards are
also associated with improved disclosure-quality (Reeb and Zhao, 2013). Our conjecture is
that the impact of a CEO’s behavioral biases could be attenuated by improving independent
oversight and exposing the CEO to a more diverse set of view-points. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted in response to corporate scandals that connoted both uneth-
ical behavior and CEO hubris. The passage of SOX along with contemporaneous changes to
7
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the NASDAQ/NYSE listing rules, represents an exogenous shock to internal corporate gov-
ernance that imposed requirements such as a majority-independent board and a completely
independent audit committee.
There are at least three key aspects of SOX that would be expected to mitigate the
impact of CEO overconfidence on SCA-likelihood. First, SOX compels an overconfident CEO
to consider alternative, independent view-points when making decisions, thereby moderating
her tendency to make reckless statements and investments. Second, SOX increases oversight,
creating more checks and balances over financial statements. For instance, Duarte et al.
(2014) argue that SOX reduces managerial discretion, implying that SOX could reduce an
overconfident CEO’s discretion to act on their biases when making investments. This increase
in oversight could, in and of itself, lead to a reduction in misreporting. 8 Finally, SOX forces
CEOs to sign-off on financial reports, presumably forcing CEOs to reflect more upon the
company’s true financial state. Thus, while there is some evidence that SOX does not per
se reduce litigation likelihood (see e.g., Malm and Mobbs, 2014), we expect that it could do
so in particular companies, such as those with overconfident CEOs, that could benefit from
additional independent oversight and monitoring.
While SOX’s provisions applied to all firms, several firms were already compliant with
the major requirements of SOX prior to its passage, while others were not (‘non-compliant’
firms). The effect of SOX in reducing the likelihood of overconfident CEOs’ companies being
sued would, therefore, be evident primarily for firms that were not previously compliant. 9
A finding that SOX impacts firms that were non-compliant – and not the compliant firms
– would indicate that it was SOX related requirements that moderated the effects of CEO
overconfidence on the likelihood of securities class actions.10 We can state the following
8Dimmock and Gerken (2014) suggest that improvements in SEC oversight significantly reduced misreport-
ing in the hedge fund sector.
9When looking at compliance, we also consider whether the firm complied with both SOX and the
NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules, as these were implemented near-simultaneously. We classify a firm as com-
pliant if, in 2000, fewer than 50% of its board members were executives and there were no executives on the
audit committee or in the nominating committee.
10Although it is worth noting here that some aspects of SOX, such as auditors’ enhanced responsibilities,
CEO certification of financial reports, corporate and criminal fraud accountability and white collar crime
penalty enhancement affected all (or virtually all) firms. We are not aware of any firms that had explicitly
8
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hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The passage of SOX reduces the likelihood that an overconfident CEO’s firm
is subject to a SCA, particularly for firms were not SOX-compliant prior to its passage.
2.3 Likelihood of SCA success
It is possible that lawsuits that are brought against firms with overconfident CEOs are of a
somewhat different quality than those against other firms. For instance, if SCAs are more
likely because of a general tendency on the part of an overconfident CEO to paint a more
positive picture, rather than actual fraudulent behavior, we would expect many of these
lawsuits to be frivolous. If so, this would presumably result in the likelihood of successful
SCA litigation being proportionately lower for overconfident CEOs. On the other hand, as we
hypothesize, if overconfident CEOs are more likely to face SCAs because of a greater tendency
to commit securities fraud (advertently or inadvertently), then we would expect there to be
no substantial difference between the likelihood of a successful SCA when a firm is headed by
overconfident CEO, relative to when it is headed by non-overconfident CEO. Thus, we state
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Likelihood of success of a SCA lawsuit will be independent of CEO’s overcon-
fidence.
2.4 Post-SCA learning
We anticipate that a SCA will attenuate the impact of CEO overconfidence on future litigation
risk. As we have hypothesized above, overconfident CEOs are more prone to either failing to
disclose negative news or to making falsely optimistic statements. We believe that occurrence
of a SCA – an impactful shock – would help to highlight the importance of adequate and
adopted such provisions prior to SOX and some as noted are changes in legal guidelines. These “unobservable”
common factors would tend to weigh against us finding significant differences between compliant and non-
compliant firms.
9
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accurate disclosure. Facing a lawsuit could plausibly cause an overconfident CEO to also
change behavior, even to question the validity of her overconfident beliefs. Consequently, we
expect that the occurrence of a SCA would reduce the impact of CEO overconfidence on future
litigation risk. Therefore, we make the following prediction:
Hypothesis 5. A SCA reduces the impact of CEO overconfidence on future litigation-risk.
A related prediction pertains to companies’ hiring practices. A SCA can worsen a com-
pany’s product market position and future access to capital. Thus, we expect a litigated firm
would seek to avoid hiring a litigation-prone CEO after it has experienced the effects of a SCA.
We expect, therefore, that a firm that faced SCAs might be inclined to select a more cautions,
less overconfident individual for its next CEO. This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. A company is less likely to hire an overconfident CEO if it was subject to a
SCA under its prior CEO.
3 Data
We create a firm-year panel data-set to examine the likelihood that a firm is subject to a securi-
ties class action in a given year. We start with the set of all companies in the CRSP/Compustat
universe. We then match this data with executive-level data from Execucomp, which we use
to identify if the CEO is overconfident. Data on whether a firm is subject to a SCA is obtained
from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearing House (SCAC). We use CRSP/Compustat
data to compute various control variables that prior literature has used when examining
litigation-likelihood (see e.g., Kim and Skinner, 2012). Relatively few of the firms in our
sample are sued more than once. The exact number of repeat-defendants varies across model
specifications (i.e., with the control variables that we require), being between 174 and 194
observations out of a sample of over 22,000 firm-year observations involving 1,375 law suits
over the 1996 to 2012 period.11 The results are robust to eliminating such repeat SCA-targets
11These SCAs, and the conduct relating thereto, pre-date the Concepcion decision, which upheld the ability
of companies to opt out of class actions through arbitration waivers, and the corporate trend thereto (see e.g.,
10
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from the sample.12 In the reported models, we follow Kim and Skinner (2012), and use firm
and two-digit industry fixed effects. However, we check that the results are robust to us-
ing firm fixed effects and alternative industry definitions including Hoberg-Phillips industry
classifications.
We use option-based and trading-based measures of overconfidence. In robustness tests,
we also check that the results are robust to news-based measures of overconfidence. The idea
behind option-based measures of overconfidence is that a CEO’s personal wealth is under-
diversified, with her human capital being tied to the firm. Consequently, a rational CEO
would exercise her options as and when they vest. An overconfident CEO would hold options,
especially deep in the money options, for an extended period. We capture this by collecting
data on the number and value of the CEO’s vested options. We start by constructing the
CONFIDENCE measure as “average-value-per-option/average-strike-price” (as per Campbell
et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Malmendier et al., 2011), where the average-value-per-
option is the total value of the CEO’s option-holdings (Execucomp: opt unex exer val) scaled
by the number of such options (Execucomp: opt unex exer num). The average-strike-price is
the firm’s stock price at the end of the fiscal year (CRSP: prcc f) less the value-per option.13
We then construct two indicator variables: CONFIDENCE TOPQ is an indicator that equals
one if the CEO’s CONFIDENCE variable is in the top quartile of all CEOs in that year.
Holder67 is the Malmendier et al. (2011) Holder67 measure (computed using publicly available
data), which is an indicator that equals one if the CONFIDENCE variable is at least 0.67 on
two or more occasions (in which case the Holder67 indicator equals one from the first time
that CONFIDENCE is at least 0.67).
We also ensure that the results are robust to using a Kolasinski and Li (2013) type measure
of CEO overconfidence.14 They characterize a CEO to be overconfident if she purchases stock
Fitzpatrick, 2015). Thus, this would not bias the results. However, the models do include year effects to
control for time-related factors.
12We discuss these results in detail in the robustness section.
13This computation works on the idea that the value per option is roughly St−X, where St is the prevailing
stock price at time t and X is the strike price. Thus, the average strike price is roughly X = St − (St −X)
14The correlation between the Holder67 measure and the trading-based measure is relatively low, at 0.002,
which is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the measures capture somewhat different aspects of CEO
11
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in her own firm and then loses money on the purchase. To construct the measure, we proceed
by identifying all CEO stock-purchases in the Thomson Reuters insider trading filings. We
determine if the CEO purchased stock in a particular year and calculate the return the CEO
earned on the purchase over the following 180 days. We define the CEO as overconfident if
he/she purchased shares and the market model buy-and-hold abnormal return was negative
in the following 180 days, where the BHAR abnormal returns are calculated using a market
model. We classify the CEO as non-overconfident if the BHAR was either positive or the
CEO did not purchase shares. In the reported tests, we focus on the variable from two years
prior to the litigation filing in order to ensure that the negative return is not merely a function
of the market’s reaction to the litigation. Additionally, we ensure the results are robust to
creating a trading-based measure based on the CEO’s trading activity in the financial year
after, or only one year before, the date in which the SCA is filed.
In Figure 1, below, we depict the start of the class period, end of the class period and the
time at which the lawsuit was filed. The average time between the end of the class period and
the SCA filing is 98 days. The average class period lasts 652 days.
Trading-based OCt−2 Trading-based OCt−1 Trading-based OCt
Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t
--98 days652 days
Class periodStart End
Avg.
filing
Figure-1: Timeline of SCA events and Trading-based Overconfidence measure
q q q
The sample composition by year is in Table 1. The table indicates that the sample size is
relatively stable over time. Approximately half of the CEOs in the sample are overconfident
(i.e., have Holder67 equal to one). This is similar to the proportion of overconfident CEOs in
behavior.
12
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prior studies using this measure (see e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Malmendier et al.,
2011). Around 65% of all law suits involve overconfident CEOs (i.e., if the company is sued,
then it is around 1.8 times as likely that the CEO is overconfident than non-overconfident).
The proportion of suits that involve overconfident CEOs fluctuates over time.
[Table 1 about here]
Summary statistics are reported in Table 2.15 We report statistics for the full sample
and for the sub-samples of companies run by overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs.
The summary statistics are relatively standard and in line with expectations. There is a
significant negative stock-price decline before the announcement of a SCA. The decline is
more severe for companies run by overconfident CEOs. Overconfident CEOs’ companies are
also more likely to be sued and to suffer more negative long-run post-SCA returns. There are
some differences between overconfident CEOs’ firms and non-overconfident CEOs’ firms. In
robustness tests (described below) we take steps to address concerns about our results being
driven by differences between overconfident CEOs’ firms and non-overconfident CEOs’ firms.
[Table 2 about here]
4 Analysis
This section presents the multivariate regression analysis. We begin by analyzing the rela-
tionship between CEO and non-CEO executive overconfidence and SCAs. Next, we explore
how governance, entrenchment, and CEO compensation can affect the relationship between
overconfidence and SCAs, with improved governance helping to mitigate the impact of CEO
overconfidence. Finally, we explore whether overconfident CEOs are more likely to be disci-
plined (as proxied by them leaving the company) following a SCA.
15In the online appendix, we also report summary statistics some more variables that used but not central
to our analysis; e.g., see Table OA1.
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4.1 Executive overconfidence and the likelihood of a SCA
We begin by testing the hypothesis that overconfident CEOs’ firms are more likely to be
sued. We analyze the relation between CEO overconfidence and litigation likelihood in Table
3. The control variables are based on the models in Kim and Skinner (2012, Tables 7, 8).16
All controls are one-period lagged.17 The regression models in Table 3, and in subsequent
tables, are logit regressions with year and SIC two-digit industry fixed effects (as per Kim
and Skinner, 2012). The year fixed effects help to mitigate the impact of legal changes over
time, such as PSLRA, that can influence SCA-likelihood (see e.g., Choi et al., 2009). The
industry fixed effects help to address prior evidence that industry-conditions can influence
fraud-propensity (Wang and Winton, 2014; Wang et al., 2010). If we use year and firm fixed
effects, we obtain qualitatively similar results to those in Table 3. This suggests that our
results are not merely capturing a time-invariant “firm” effect, and that changing the level of
CEO-overconfidence at a given firm can affect SCA-likelihood.18
The important finding in Table 3 is that CEO overconfidence is significantly and positively
related to the likelihood of the company being sued, supporting Hypothesis 1. This result is
economically significant. Using the marginal effect of 1.54% associated with CEO Holder67 in
Column 1 of Table 3 and 4.5% average litigation risk for non-OC led firms stated in Table 2,
we find that overconfident managers are 33% more likely to be sued than are otherwise similar
non-overconfident CEOs. We obtain similar results when focusing on the trading-based (as in
Kolasinski and Li, 2013) measure of overconfidence in Column 2 of Table 3.
The coefficients on the control variables are largely consistent with expectations and with
prior literature (see e.g., Choi, 2006; Field et al., 2005; Kim and Skinner, 2012). Insider trading
is not significantly related to SCA-likelihood. This is consistent with prior findings that there
is little abnormal insider trading prior to SCAs (Niehaus and Roth, 1999). Institutional
16Alternatively we used Hoberg-Phillips industry classification and we obtain results that are almost exactly
the same. We stated these results in the Online Appendix.
17The core results are robust to using twice-lagged controls.
18However, using the firm fixed effect instead of industry fixed effect causes our sample size to shrink to only
5,000 observations (from around 20,000) observations as many companies never experience a SCA, and many
companies experience only one SCA. Hence, for most part of our analysis we rely on industry fixed effect.
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ownership is positively related to SCA-likelihood. This likely reflects the role of institutional
investors in monitoring firms (and disciplining firms for misconduct), especially in light of
SCA-reforms that emphasize the presence of a lead plaintiff (i.e., an institutional investor)
to pursue the case (Perino, 2012, 2014). It is also consistent with prior evidence that some
institutional shareholders tend to face lower costs in pursuing litigation (Choi et al., 2011).
Firms that raise equity are more likely to be sued. This is unsurprising given the prior evidence
on litigation around equity issuance. Firms with lower and more volatile stock returns are
more likely to be sued (as in Arena and Julio, 2015; Choi, 2006; Gande and Lewis, 2009; Jones
and Weingram, 1996). This is consistent with the idea that a 10b-5 case will be successful
only if the shareholders suffered a loss after they purchased the stock.
Corporate fundamentals are also related to litigation-likelihood. Larger firms are more
likely to be sued, possibly because larger firms have more assets with which to meet any
litigation payout. Similarly firms with higher ROA and sales growth are more likely to be
sued, which is in line with prior evidence that large cash holdings can render firms vulnerable
to litigation-like disputes with unions (Arena and Julio, 2015; Klasa et al., 2009). Conversely,
higher levels of PP&E reduce SCA-likelihood (after controlling for the firm’s asset-size). This
could reflect the fact that PP&E cannot be easily converted into cash in order to meet a
litigation-payout, making the company a less attractive target.
[Table 3 about here]
We next examine the relationship between non-CEO executive overconfidence and the like-
lihood of a SCA. We analyze the overconfidence of all executives for the firm in Execucomp
database: senior executives and junior executives. In each case we construct our option-
based, and trading-based, measures of overconfidence for the firm’s executives in Execucomp.
We have several findings: First, under both the option-based, and trading-based measures of
overconfidence, executive overconfidence is significantly associated with litigation risk; i.e., the
Holder67 measure is significant and positive, whereas the trading-based measure is statisti-
cally significant and negative. Second, this effect seems to concentrate in the senior executives
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and the CEO: in regressions that include CEO (and/or senior executive) overconfidence, ju-
nior executive overconfidence is found to be statistically insignificant, indicating that junior
executives’ overconfidence is not the primary driver of litigation risk. Overall, the results on
senior executives’ behavioral attributes and litigation risk are supportive of Hypothesis 2.
[Table 4 about here]
4.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, CEO overconfidence and the likeli-
hood of a SCA
We test the hypothesis that SOX ameliorates the impact of managerial overconfidence on
SCA-likelihood (Hypothesis 3). For these tests, we focus on the option-based measure of
overconfidence. We do not use the trading-based measure because the small sample size
hinders reliable estimation. Requiring board data on whether the firm was SOX-compliant
and restricting the analysis to the years around SOX, reduces the sample size substantially.
The sample is further restricted for the trading-based measure, resulting in relatively few cases
in which we can identify compliance with SOX and have data on CEOs’ trading activities with
which to detect CEO overconfidence.
We start by interacting the option-based measure of overconfidence with a “Post SOX”
indicator that equals one if the observation occurs in 2002 or later and equals zero otherwise.
When examining SOX, we restrict the sample to be six years on either side of SOX (i.e.,
1996-2008). We use a post-SOX indicator in addition to splitting the sample by whether the
firm was previously compliant with SOX’s governance provisions. This is because SOX could
enhance governance even in compliant firms through (inter alia) requiring CEOs to personally
sign-off on financial reports, by increasing audit-stringency, and by enhancing internal controls
(see e.g., Arping and Sautner, 2013).19 We define a company as compliant if, in 2000, it had a
majority non-executive board and had no executives on its audit and nominating committees.
19For example, related work indicates that SEC oversight significantly improved hedge fund governance and
reporting (Dimmock and Gerken, 2014).
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The results are in Table 5. In Column 1, the interaction term of the post-SOX dummy
with the overconfidence measures are negative and statistically significant. In Columns 2 and
3 of Table 5 we analyze the sub-samples of firms that were SOX-compliant and those that
were not.20 We find that the interaction term is negative and significant only for the non-
compliant sub-sample. The difference between the coefficients on the interaction term between
the compliant and non-compliant subsamples is statistically significant. For the non-compliant
firms, the improvement in the impact of overconfidence is economically meaningful: prior to
SOX, in non-compliant firms, overconfident CEOs increased litigation risk by 2.4 percentage
points (from a sample average of around 6 percentage points). After SOX, the impact of
overconfidence decreased by 2.1 percentage points, suggesting that overconfidence increased
litigation risk by only 0.3 percentage points post-SOX. The results indicate that SOX mainly
affected firms that were not previously compliant with its major provisions, consistent with
Hypothesis 3.
While smaller firms were exempt from SOX, this is unlikely to bias our results since our
sample comprises only Execucomp (i.e., S&P 1500).21 Further, the SOX results are unlikely
to merely reflect an increase in litigation following the dot-com crash: the reported models
include industry and year fixed effects and we obtain qualitatively similar results (unreported)
if we exclude “high tech” firms or IT firms, following the definition in Loughran and Ritter
(2004).
[Table 5 about here]
4.3 Likelihood of successful SCAs
One concern is that an overconfident CEO, who makes many positive comments, is an easy
target for a frivolous/non-meritorious SCA. We mitigate this concern by hand collecting data
20We focus on analyzing sub-samples, rather than triple interactions, due to the difficulties interpreting
triple interactions in LOGIT models. The sub-sample analysis also allows the coefficients on the controls to
vary across subsamples, helping to mitigate any confounding effect arising from differential impacts of controls.
21For example, the exemption from Section 404(b) applies only to companies with a market capitalization
of under $75 million.
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(from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse) on whether the litigation is found
in favor of the plaintiff or of the defendant (i.e., the company). For our test, we focus on
the sample of firms that are already subject to SCAs. The dependent variable is an indicator
that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year t and the SCA results in a successful
litigation in the future and zero otherwise. The results are in Table 6. We find that the
coefficient associated with CEO Holder67 is statistically insignificant, suggesting that there is
no significant difference in the nature of the SCAs faced by overconfident CEOs, as indicated
by the likelihood of eventual success.
[Table 6 about here]
Further, we ensure that our baseline results are robust to excluding any SCA that is
unsuccessful (and treating such firms as if they never had a SCA). This robustness test is
premised on the assumption that all failed SCAs are frivolous. As reported in Table 7 the
core results hold even if we replace the “SCA” indicator with an indicator that equals one if
the firm is exposed to an ultimately successful law suit and equals zero otherwise, i.e., if it is
exposed to an successful suit or no suit.
[Table 7 about here]
4.4 Post-SCA learning by CEOs
We expect a securities class action will tend to reduce the impact of CEO overconfidence
on future litigation-risk. We expect this because the occurrence of a SCA could persuade
an overconfident CEO about the need to engage in adequate disclosure and to moderate her
tendency to make excessively optimistic statements about future prospects. We test this by
analyzing the likelihood that firms with overconfident CEOs face additional SCAs after their
first SCA in our sample. This likelihood is compared to the likelihood of the firm being sued
for the first time.
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The results are in Table 8 and suggest that a SCA reduces the likelihood that an over-
confident CEO is sued again. We analyze the impact of overconfidence on future litigation
risk by looking at the impact of overconfidence on (a) the likelihood of a first SCA (Model
2 & 4), and (b) the likelihood of a second SCA given that the firm has already experienced
one SCA in the past (Model 1 & 3). When looking at the trading-based measure we use a
four-period lagged measure in order to have a measure that pre-dates the average prior suit. 22
We find that whereas overconfidence is significantly associated with litigation risk for firms
that have never faced a SCA before, it is not significantly related to litigation risk for firms
that have already been sued.23 This implies that a SCA tends to reduce future litigation risk
in firms led by overconfident CEOs. In unreported robustness tests we find that the results
are qualitatively similar if we require the CEO to be with the firm for at least 2, 3, or 4 years
after the first SCA – thereby mitigating concern that the only reason overconfident CEOs’
appear less likely to face SCAs is because they are fired and drop out of the sample.
[Table 8 about here]
We explore the reasons for the result. One possibility is that a SCA, especially the first
SCA, constitutes a significant shock, which causes the CEO to become more cautious and
potentially less overconfident. Such a possibility is consistent with the finding in Bernile et al.
(2014) that CEOs that experienced both extreme shocks (in their case, natural disasters)
and the consequences thereof reduce their risk-taking behavior. This in turn, coheres with
prior findings in the psychology literature that disasters can influence individual risk-taking
behavior in investments.24 We assess the impact of a firm being sued in year t or in year t− 1
on a continuous analogue to Holder67. We define this continuous analogue as the average
22On average, a second class action, if it occurs, occurs 1.3 years after the first class action.
23 We also note that several other corporate characteristics can change in the years after the SCA. However,
in unreported results, we find that the coefficients on the overconfidence measures are qualitatively similar if
we control for differences in the controls, rather than the level of the controls per se.
24For example, Cassar et al. (2011) and Cameron and Shah (2013) find that disaster survivors prefer less
risky gambles. Similarly, Bucciol and Zarri (2013) indicate that disaster survivors prefer to invest in cash and
less risky assets.
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‘in-the-moneyness’ of the CEO’s options. We construct this by using the continuous variable
that Malmendier et al. (2011) discretize to obtain Holder67.25
The results for these regressions are in Table 9. Panel A focuses on the impact of a SCA
per se. Panel B specifically analyzes the impact of the first SCA. In all cases, we include the
controls in Table 3, industry effects, and year effects.26 We also analyze sub-samples in which
the firm earned a non-negative return in the years following the SCA. This is to mitigate
any concern that relationship (or lack thereof) between SCAs and confidence is merely a
mechanical consequence of a decline in stock price. The results in Panel A indicate that the
occurrence of a SCA in year t − 1 does not significantly erode the confidence measure at t,
after controlling for other corporate characteristics. However, Panel B indicates that the first
SCA does reduce the CEO’s confidence level. These results are consistent with the idea that
the first SCA may constitute a shock that reduces CEO overconfidence, leading to a reduction
in SCA likelihood.
[Table 9 about here]
4.5 Post-SCA learning by companies in hiring practices
In a similar manner to CEOs becoming more disciplined following a SCA, companies might
alter their hiring practices if a CEO was associated with a SCA. Specifically, we hypothesize
that if a company was sued under its prior CEO then it will tend to select a new CEO who is
less overconfident; and, thus, associated with lower litigation risk. We test this hypothesis by
analyzing the overconfidence-level (represented by Holder67) of the new CEO. In these tests,
we identify all situations where the company’s CEO in year t differs from that in year t − 1.
25We define CONFIDENCE as the average value per vested option scaled by the average strike price of
the options. The average value per vested option is the total (estimated) value of all options (Execucomp:
‘opt unex exer est val’) scaled by the total number of such options (Execucomp: ‘opt unex exer num’). The
average strike price works on the simplifying assumption that the options have call-like payoff-structures; and
thus, the strike price (X) is X = S− (S−X), where S is the prevailing stock price and we compute the value
of the options (S −X) as the aforementioned average value per vested option that we use as the numerator.
26The reported models are OLS regressions. In robustness tests, we ensure the results are also robust to
using quantile regressions, robust regressions, and Tobit models with a lower bound of zero, as appropriate.
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We then identify whether the prior CEO was associated with a SCA during his/her time at
the company. Next, we obtain the Holder67 measure for the new CEO. We compute this in
both year t and in year t + 1 in order to ensure that reporting errors around the turnover do
not bias our results.
The results are in Table 10. The analysis is cross-sectional. The main finding is that if a
prior CEO was associated with a SCA, then the company’s newly hired CEO is less likely to
be overconfident.27 This applies when we use an indicator for whether the prior CEO faced
SCA (Columns 1 and 3) or look at the total number of law suits leveled against the company
during the prior CEO’s time at the company. In unreported robustness tests we also find that
the results hold if we require that the new CEO stays at the firm for at least five years (so the
results are unlikely to merely reflect litigated firms having a “revolving door” of CEOs such
that the new CEO, while overconfident, does not last long enough for the Holder67 measure to
be meaningful). The results, overall, support Hypothesis 6 and are consistent with companies
moderating their hiring practices to avoid overconfident CEOs.
[Table 10 about here]
5 Alternative explanations and robustness tests
5.1 Media-based measures of overconfidence
The main reported models use the option-based measure of overconfidence. However, prior lit-
erature does show that there is a relationship between compensation-structures and litigation-
risk (see e.g., Peng and Ro¨ell, 2008). This raises the possibility that option-based measures of
overconfidence merely reflect the impact of CEOs’ compensation structure. We argue that this
is unlikely to be the case because (1) the option-based measures of overconfidence are derived
from the CEO’s exercise (or lack thereof) of vested options, not merely from the receipt of
27To put the results in perspective, around 67% of the sample of CEOs are classified as overconfident, accord-
ing to the Holder67 measure. However, only around 30% of CEOs hired after a class action are overconfident
in our sample, suggesting a signficiant difference in confidence between old and newly hired CEOs.
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options per se, and (2) we find that the impact of option-compensation on litigation-likelihood
is separate and distinct from the impact of overconfidence.28 Nonetheless, we check that the
results are robust to alternative measures of overconfidence.
An alternative way of measuring overconfidence is through media-based measures (per Hir-
shleifer et al., 2012). We ensure the results are robust to a “net news” measure. We construct
this measure by hand-collecting news-based data between 2000 and 2006 from Factiva. To do
this, we search for newspaper reports that refer to the CEO as ‘confident’, ‘optimistic’, ‘posi-
tive’ (for confident news) as opposed to reports that refer to the CEO as ‘not confident’, ‘not
optimistic’, ‘not positive’, or ‘cautions’ (for non-confident news). We then construct a ‘net
news’ measure as the number of confident reports less the number of non-confident reports.
We restrict attention to the set of firms that have at least one ‘positive’ news item in order
to: (1) ensure that we are not biasing the sample by including thinly reported firms and/or
firms for which we simply failed to obtain information, and (2) to get a concept of how the
degree of overconfidence influences litigation risk.29 We report the baseline models using the
media-based measure in Table 11.30 The results in Table 11 are qualitatively similar to the
reported results: overconfident CEOs are more likely to be subject to a SCA than are other
CEOs.
[Table 11 about here]
5.2 CEO Characteristics
A concern is that the Holder67 variable might be correlated with the option intensity of the
CEO’s compensation contract and/or its wealth-performance sensitivity, causing the results to
28Particularly, when analyzing SFAS 123R we find that a reduction in option-compensation (following the
accounting-rule change) reduces the impact of overconfidence on litigation-likelihood, implying that it has
a separate (albeit complementary) impact from overconfidence. These results are reported in the Online
Appendix.
29The results are stronger in our favor if we recode such missing values as zero to ‘deem’ such CEOs to have
low confidence.
30In unreported tests, we find that the results are qualitatively similar if we twice-lag the media-measure to
further obviate any concern about feedback between the SCA and the single-lagged media-measure.
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reflect spurious correlation between Holder67 and compensation. Ameliorating this concern,
the foregoing results vis-a`-vis the media-based measure of overconfidence and the Kolasinski
and Li (2013) trading-based measure of overconfidence are not subject to this concern (as
they are not derived from option-holdings). Nonetheless, we check that the results are robust
to controlling for the ‘option intensity’ of the CEO’s compensation contract and the ‘wealth-
performance sensitivity’ of that contract. We define the contract’s option intensity to be
the proportion of total pay that comes from option grants.31 We obtain the scaled wealth-
performance sensitivity measure from Edmans et al. (2009).32
The models controlling for option intensity are in Panel A of Table 12 and those controlling
for wealth-performance-sensitivity are in Panel B of Table 12. The Holder67 variable remains
positive and significant in all models, suggesting that compensation characteristics do not
drive the results.
[Table 12 about here]
5.3 Repeat lawsuit targets
The results are robust to addressing the issue of firms being sued repeatedly. In the ‘raw’
SCA data (i.e., set of SCAs for all firms before restricting the sample to the set of firms with
relevant company-level variables), there are 2559 lawsuits against 2089 unique firms, of which
329 unique firms were sued more than once. In the data, 256 lawsuits (from 106 unique firms)
overlapped in class periods. In percentage terms, 256/2559 = 10% of lawsuits overlap in class
periods; 106/329=32.2% of firms with multiple lawsuits overlap in class periods; 106/2089
=5.07% of unique firms were litigated in overlapping class periods. In our sample (with non-
missing control variables), removing firms that are sued more than once results in a loss of
only between 174 to 194 observations (depending on the controls required) from an overall
31In Execucomp, we use tdc1 as the total compensation variable. The value of the option grants is
option awards blk value after Black-Scholes values were used and option awards before then.
32The relevant wealth-performance sensitivity data is available from Alex Edmans’s website: http:
//faculty.london.edu/aedmans/data.html, accessed on 31 December 2014.
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sample of 1375 litigation-observations. The regression results are robust to omitting these
observations. We report the regressions in Table 13. The main finding is that the results
are qualitatively similar in these regressions: CEO overconfidence remains significantly and
positively associated with the likelihood of a SCA.
[Table 13 about here]
5.4 Does the CEO-SCA relationship merely reflect earnings man-
agement?
We take steps to ensure that our results do not merely reflect the impact of CEO overconfi-
dence on earnings management. Prior evidence suggests that overconfident CEOs’ account-
ing statements are less conservative, including through postponing loss recognition (Ahmed
and Duellman, 2013), and undertaking earnings smoothing (Bouwman, 2014). Thus, a con-
cern is that the relationship between overconfidence and SCAs merely reflects the previously
documented impact of overconfidence on accounting-practices. We mitigate this concern by
ensuring that the results hold after controlling for absolute discretionary accruals.
We calculate discretionary accruals following the modified Jones (1991) model (as per
Ayers et al., 2006). We do this as follows: We calculate the firm’s Total Accruals as its
earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI) less its cash flows from operations (Cash Flows,
which we calculate as the firm’s net cash flows from operating activities less its extraordinary
items).33 We scale Total Accruals by the firm’s Total Assets in the prior year. For each year
and two-digit SIC industry, we estimate the regression:
Total Accrualsi,t = α + β
(1) (ΔSalesi,t −ΔReceivablesi,t) + β(2)PP&Ei,t + εi,t
Where, Total Accruals is defined in the above step, ΔSales is the difference in the firm’s sales
(Compustat: sale) in year t and year t− 1, ΔReceivables is the change in accounts receivable
33In specific Compustat codes, we define Total Accruals as ibc - (oancf - xidoc).
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(Compustat: reccch), and PP&E is the firm’s gross property plant and equipment. Because
we estimate the regression separately for each two-digit industry and year, we do not include
industry or year effects, and we require that there be at least 10 firms in the industry/year
pair (per Ayers et al., 2006). We scale all variables by the firm’s total assets in year t− 1. We
define the firm’s discretionary accruals as the difference between it’s Total Accruals and that
predicted by above equation. Because earnings management can result in either positive or
negative deviations from the ‘predicted’ accruals, we take the absolute discretionary accruals.
We denote this as ABS Discretionary Accruals.
We report the results in Table 14. The core finding is that CEO Holder67 continues to
increase litigation likelihood even after controlling for discretionary accruals. Further, the
interaction of CEO Holder67 with the earnings management measure is statistically insignif-
icant. This suggests that the impact of overconfidence does not depend significantly on, or
merely reflect, a relationship between CEO overconfidence and earnings practices.
[Table 14 about here]
5.5 Systematic differences and panel models
We also ensure that the results are robust to modeling technique. One concern is that there
might be systematic differences between companies that are subject to a SCA and those that
are not. We mitigate this by using propensity score matching techniques. These results
are provided in additional panel regressions in Online Appendix. We perform two sets of
propensity score matches. The first set matches overconfident CEOs to non-overconfident
CEOs. We match in two ways: First, we run a first stage model predicting the likelihood that
a CEO is overconfident. Next, we construct a distribution of propensity scores for the set
of overconfident firms. Then we identify the 10th percentile cut-off. Finally, we estimate the
regression omitting any non-overconfident CEO firm with propensity score that lies below this
10th percentile cut-off. In the second method of matching, we undertake one-to-four nearest
neighbor matching. Further, in our second set of matches, we match SCA firms to non-SCA
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firms in a similar way. In all cases we find that overconfident managers’ firms are more likely
to face SCAs. We obtain similar results if we undertake one-to-one matching (instead of one-
to-four matching) or if we use a different percentile cut-off instead of the 10 th percentile (e.g.,
the results are robust to using the 5th and 15th percentiles). We also find similar results in a
regression that uses firm and year fixed effects.
5.6 Option-based overconfidence and firm performance
One concern is that option-based measures of overconfidence increase with the firm’s per-
formance; and thus, the Holder67 measure might merely proxy for other extraneous market
movements. The media-based measure of overconfidence at least partially mitigates this con-
cern. Nonetheless, we also address this concern by using a “residual” measure of CEO over-
confidence. We define the “Residual CEO Holder67 (t-1)” variable as the residual from the
regression CEO Holder67 (t-1) = α + β ×Return(t− 1) + ε, where Return is the firm’s stock
return. This Residual CEO Holder67 (t-1) would capture the portion of CEO overconfidence
that does not merely reflect stock returns. These results are available in Online Appendix.
The results are qualitatively similar to those previously reported.
5.7 Reverse causality: OC CEOs self-selecting into high SCA-risk
companies
An alternative explanation for our baseline result, i.e., overconfidence is associated with in-
creased litigation risk is that overconfident individuals optimistically believe they can manage
a risky company and are relatively more willing to take such risks. In this case, the company’s
high litigation risk could conceivably cause it to select an overconfident CEO, rather than the
overconfident CEO increasing litigation risk. Our foregoing results tend to suggest that such
reverse causality concerns do not explain the results. The finding in Table 10 that companies
prefer to avoid hiring such litigation-risk prone CEOs following a SCA suggests that reverse
causality of that type is unlikely to drive our baseline results.
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5.8 Endogeneity concern: CEOs make false statements to boost
value of options
A possible concern is that the Holder67 is premised on the CEO holding options that are at
least 67% in the money. However, if the CEO pumps up the stock price, then it would also
increase the value of her option-holdings and could lead to those options becoming at least
67% in the money. Further, prior evidence suggests that CEOs might strategically time their
trading, and, by parity of reasoning, option exercises (Billings and Cedergren, 2015). Thus,
the conduct leading to the SCA might create the appearance of the CEO intentionally holding
highly in the money options, when in fact it was an indirect consequence of misstatement.
We argue that endogeneity is unlikely to drive the results: (1) The options must be at least
67% in the money in at least two separate years, minimizing the chance of the CEO making
false statements that merely indirectly inflate the value of the options. (2) The results are
qualitatively similar if we use alternative measures of overconfidence, that are not subject
to this criticism (see above and Table 11). (3) Prior literature shows that such risk-taking
tendencies (as connoted by such measures as Holder67) tend to derive from genetic charac-
teristics. For example, Cesarini et al. (2009) examine sets of twins and argue that genetics
explains between 16% and 34% of an individual’s overconfidence. Cronqvist and Siegel (2013)
suggest that genetic differences can explain up to 45% of the variation in investment biases in
individual investors. Similarly, Cronqvist et al. (2014) argue that genetic-characteristics also
explain home ownership choice (which suggests that genetic-characteristics could also explain
risk-taking in investment in general) and/or early life experiences (Bernile et al., 2014; Mal-
mendier et al., 2011). Similarly, Malmendier et al. (2011) show that early-life experiences,
such as growing up in the Great Depression, or having military experience, are associated
with the degree of managerial overconfidence and influence corporate risk-taking tendencies.
(4) It is often the case that “informed” traders short the company’s stock (or manufacture a
short position) prior to SCAs (Blau and Tew, 2014), which would imply that CEOs should
endeavor to exercise any options prior to the SCA; i.e., the prospect of a SCA would not cause
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the CEO to hold in the money options. (5) Such stock-price manipulation would be short
term at best. If the CEO were to make false statements simply to increase the value of their
options, then she would benefit only if she exercised the options before the market became
aware of the true facts (whereupon the stock price would decline) and would risk violating
insider-trading rules, which carry criminal, penalties.
Nonetheless, in unreported tests, we take additional steps to mitigate these endogeneity
concerns. First, the results are qualitatively similar if we exclude any situation where the firm
is subject to two SCAs. This excludes any situation where the CEO could have pumped up
the stock price twice (rendering the CEO overconfident according to the Holder67 definition).
Thus, it excludes certain situations where the CEO’s conduct giving rise to the SCA also
inflated the stock price and created the appearance of overconfidence.
Second, we obtain qualitatively similar results if we measure overconfidence based on the
CEO’s conduct after year t. In this case, it would be necessary for the options to be at
least 67% in the money on two occasions after the SCA, meaning that the falsely positive
misstatement cannot have driven the value of the options.
Third, in unreported tests, we obtain qualitatively similar results if we omit any situation
where the CEO would have “inflated” the stock price in order to exercise her options. The
underlying concern is that the CEO might “hype” the stock, which would give rise to the
SCA and also tend to make options look more valuable – causing the CEO to appear to be
overconfident. We address this by excluding from the sample any situation where the CEO
exercises options in year t or t − 1, when the SCA was in year t. The results for these tests
are qualitatively similar to the reported results.
5.9 Does the SCA/overconfidence relationship just reflect volatil-
ity?
One concern is that the relationship between SCAs and overconfidence merely reflects volatil-
ity; i.e., OC CEOs take more risk. Riskier firms are more likely to face SCAs. Thus, the
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relationship between overconfidence and SCAs might merely reflect volatility. The baseline
models include volatility as a control variable. Nevertheless, to further explore this issue
we perform regressions that interact CEO overconfidence with volatility: a statistically in-
significant interaction term would indicate that the SCA/overconfidence relationship does not
depend on volatility. We find that CEO overconfidence remains significantly positively asso-
ciated with litigation risk. The interaction term is statistically insignificant. The results are
qualitatively unchanged whether or not we undertake relevant corrections for standard errors
on interaction effects in logit models (per Ai and Norton, 2003). These results are available
in Online Appendix.
5.10 Does OC CEO merely represent aggressive “corporate” cul-
ture?
A concern is that aggressive corporations, which are more likely to be subject to a SCA due
to the culture of risk-taking, seek overconfident CEOs, meaning that the overconfidence/SCA
relationship merely reflects other corporate factors. We argue that this is unlikely to be a
concern. First, we control for corporate characteristics, including corporate risk (as prox-
ied by stock return volatility). Second, Table 4 partially ameliorates this concern: The
overconfidence-level of junior executives captures the nature of the firm’s corporate culture, if
an aggressive firm tends to also hire more overconfident junior executives. However, the over-
confidence of junior executives is not significantly related to SCA-likelihood after controlling
for the overconfidence of senior executives (i.e., decision-makers). Thus, it is unlikely that
CEO overconfidence merely captures another corporate trait. Third, as indicated above, the
results are robust to including firm fixed effects, which control for unobserved time-invariant
firm attributes, that would include a particularly aggressive and persistent corporate culture.
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5.11 CEO inattention and the option-based measure of overconfi-
dence
A possible concern with the option-based measures of overconfidence relates to CEO inat-
tention. Specifically, if a CEO holds relatively few options, then she might hold well in the
money options because the value of exercising them is low and the CEO might simply ignore
them. We argue that this is unlikely to drive the results given that they are robust to using the
media-based measure of overconfidence (see Table 11). Nonetheless, in unreported analysis we
find that our main results hold if we exclude from the sample any CEO whose option-holdings
(i.e., value of vested but unexercised options) are in the bottom quartile of the sample for
that year.
5.12 Does CEO overconfidence capture poor corporate performance?
An issue with the models is to address whether CEO overconfidence merely reflects poor
corporate performance. The baseline models address this in part by controlling for the prior
year’s stock return. Further, we analyze the interaction of CEO Holder67 and prior returns;
either the return over year t − 1 or an indicator for whether the return was negative. These
results are available in Online Appendix. The main result is that while the interaction term
is statistically insignificant, the CEO Holder67 term remains statistically significant. This
further indicates that the relationship between SCAs and CEO overconfidence does not merely
reflect prior poor performance.
5.13 Non-detection of “misconduct”
A factor that could affect results is the non-detection of managerial misconduct. Specifically,
it is possible that a CEO may engage in actions that would satisfy the criteria for a SCA, but
that shareholders (a) chose not to sue and/or (b) did not detect such actions. In our sample,
both are unlikely: Our sample only contains S&P 1500 firms, which are large companies
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with analyst coverage and media scrutiny (rendering detection likely). Further, such S&P
1500 companies ordinarily have sufficient financial resources to make a successful litigation
financially beneficial to a plaintiff. Additionally, in the US, unlike in some other countries,
forming a “class” to undertake a class action is comparatively straight-forward and litigation-
funders would ensure that the indigence (or otherwise) of the plaintiffs would not lead to
under-litigation in cases where there is a legitimate cause-of-action (as opposed to a frivolous
case).
To illustrate this, around 4%-5% of our firm-year observations involve a SCA. By contrast,
Chapple et al. (2014) find that there are 30 SCAs in Australia (on the ASX) against any
Australian listed company between 1999-2010. Australia has similar laws covering continuous
disclosure (and the theoretical ability to litigate) as does the US, containing an equivalent
to Rule 10b-5. However, Australia has greater restrictions on forming a class and on using a
litigation funder. The number of firms listed on the ASX in any given year varies. However,
it exceeds 1500 in each year of the sample (suggesting 18,000 potential firm year observations
over this time period), in which case under 0.1% of the firm-year observations would experience
a SCA. Even if the focus is on the largest 500 companies listed on the ASX 500 (in order to
ensure availability of all relevant controls), only 30/6000=0.5% of the sample would exhibit a
SCA. Thus, whereas under-litigation of misconduct might be a concern in Australia, the US
(for the above-mentioned reasons) is unlikely to be so affected.
5.14 CEO age
CEO age is arguably associated with corporate risk taking, with younger CEOs being associ-
ated with riskier corporate policies (see e.g., Kim, 2013; Serfling, 2014). In unreported tests,
we also analyze whether the results are robust to controlling for CEO age, or indicators for
whether the CEO is over 50, 60, or 65. CEO age is generally negatively related to litigation-
likelihood.34 Controlling for these measures of CEO age does not qualitatively change the
34However, the statistical significance of the coefficient is sensitive to the set of control variables used.
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relationship between CEO overconfidence and litigation-likelihood (see e.g., Panel C of Table
12). We also undertake additional tests to analyze whether the impact of overconfidence varies
across CEO age. These results are available in Online Appendix. We find that the interaction
of CEO age with Holder67 is statistically insignificant. Additionally, if we split the sample
into “young CEOs” (age in the bottom half of the sample) and “old CEOs” (age in the top
half of the sample), we find that CEO overconfidence is positively and significantly related to
litigation risk in both sub-samples.
5.15 Managerial entrenchment
Managerial entrenchment may influence litigation likelihood. On the one hand, entrenched
managers are subject to less outside disciplinary action; and thus, are more free to engage in
actions leading to a class action. On the other hand, entrenched managers may seek to “enjoy
the quiet life,” whereby they engage in relatively less risk-taking (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2003), which, while potentially undermining shareholder wealth, would lower the risk of a
class action. Whichever is the case, we check that the results are robust to controlling for
the Gompers et al. (2003) index of 24 anti-takeover provisions (see e.g., Panel D of Table
12). In unreported results, we find that the coefficient on Holder67 is robust to controlling for
the Bebchuk et al. (2009) index of six anti-takeover provisions, or indicators, for whether the
company’s index-value is above the sample median or is in the top quartile.
5.16 CEO gender and board gender diversity
We check that the results do not merely reflect a CEO-gender effect. Levi et al. (2014)
argue that female CEOs are less overconfident than are male CEOs, leading to fewer takeover
bids and more value-creation in those bids. However, Adams and Ragunathan (2013) argue
that female directors are not per se associated with lower risk taking. Nonetheless, we check
that our results are robust to controlling for CEO gender and interacting an indicator for
whether the CEO is female with the overconfidence measure. The results are unreported for
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brevity. Only 1.7% of the observations in our sample feature a female CEO. The impact of
CEO overconfidence on litigation-risk varies slightly across CEO gender: overconfident female
CEOs are less likely to face SCAs than are overconfident male CEOs. This is potentially
consistent with Levi et al. (2014). However, the result is only weakly significant and there
are relatively few female CEOs in the sample, making it difficult to draw strong conclusions
from the results. Similarly, we find that board gender diversity is not statistically significantly
related to litigation likelihood.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of CEO overconfidence on the likelihood of a securities class ac-
tion. By definition, overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate the potential payoffs of projects
and underestimate their risks. This could result in overconfident CEOs’ statements being
reckless and falsely positive, thereby exposing the company to a 10b-5 securities class action.
We hypothesize and show that overconfident CEOs’ firms are more likely to be sued via a
SCA. Further, improved governance mitigates the impact of overconfidence on SCA-likelihood.
Specifically, the impact of overconfidence on SCA-likelihood decreases following SOX and the
changes to the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules.
We find that SCAs appear to serve a learning function for overconfident CEOs, with a SCA
reducing the impact of CEO overconfidence on future litigation risk. This suggests that SCAs
persuade overconfident CEOs to attenuate their tendency to make overconfident and falsely
positive statements, or to be cavalier about omitting material information (overconfident in
their belief that the firm could rectify a negative outcome). This finding is consistent with
the finding in Kolasinski and Li (2013), in the context of takeovers, that overconfident CEOs
do learn from past actions. These results contribute to the policy debate about the welfare
effects of SCAs, that some have criticized as being largely frivolous and wasteful.
The paper contributes to both the literature on CEO overconfidence and on securities reg-
ulation. We demonstrate another avenue through which CEO overconfidence can undermine
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shareholder wealth (exposing the company to a SCA). This highlights the need for share-
holders to be cautious when interpreting statements provided by overconfident CEOs. The
paper also contributes to the regulation-literature by exploring an additional antecedent to
financial-misstatements (CEOs’ behavioral biases).
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Appendix: Variables
Variable Definition
CEO HOLDER67 The CEO’s HOLDER67 value computed in the same way as computed in Malmendier
et al. (2011). This is an indicator that equals one from the first time that the CEO
holds options that are (on average) at least 67% in the money if the CEO does so
on at least two occaisions. We use Execucomp data to obtain a measure for how
in the money the options are on average. We first create a measure of the extent
to which the options are in-the-money, defined as Average value per option/Number
of options, where the Average value per option is the estimated value of the vested
optiosn scaled by the number of such options. We then scale this ‘in-the-moneyness’
variable by the average strike price for the options, which we proxy as S − (S −X)
= Stock price at the end of the fiscal year (in CRSP/Compustat: prcc f) - the avera
average value per option (computed as indicated previously).
TEAM HOLDER67 The average Holder67 measure for all executives at the firm in that year. We compute
the Holder67 measure for non-CEO executives in the same way as we compute CEO
HOLDER67.
OTHER EXEC HOLDER67 The average Holder67 measure for all non-CEO executives at the firm in that year.
We compute the Holder67 measure for non-CEO executives in the same way as we
compute CEO HOLDER67.
SENIOR HOLDER67 The average Holder67 measure for all senior executives at the firm in that year.
We compute the Holder67 measure for non-CEO executives in the same way as
we compute CEO HOLDER67. We define senior executives as any executive with
the title (in Execucomp) of CEO, CFO, COO, President, Chairman/woman, and
executives whose title includes the word ‘chief’.
JUNIOR HOLDER67 The average Holder67 measure for all junior executives at the firm in that year.
We compute the Holder67 measure for non-CEO executives in the same way as we
compute CEO HOLDER67. We define junior executives as any non-senior executive.
CEO180TradingOC The average 180-days trading window based OC measure for CEO in that year. This
overconfidence measure is computed in the same way as computed in Kolasinski and
Li (2013).
NYSE An indicator that equals one if the firm trades on the New York Stock Exchange.
LNASSET The natural log of the firm’s book assets (Compustat: at).
ROA The firm’s return on assets, defined as its net income scaled by its assets.
SALES GROWTH The sales growth in year t− 1 is the sales in year t− 1 less the sales in year t− 2 all
scaled by the assets at the beginning of year t− 1.
R&D The R&D expense (Compustat: xrd) scaled by the beginning-of-year assets.
PP&E The firms property, plant and equipment scaled by its assets.
MB The firm’s market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat: prcc f ×
csho) scaled by its book value of equity.
RETURN The firm’s market adjusted stock return over the year (with stock return data from
CRSP).
SKEW The skewness of the firm’s stock return over the year
RETURN STD DEV The standard deviation of the daily stock return over the year.
TURNOVER The trading volume for the year scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the
beginning of the year.
INST The percentage of shares that institutional investors hold. The institutional-holding
data is from the Thomson 13F filings. If the firm does not appear in the filings, we
deem it to have zero institutional holdings.
EQUITY PROCEEDS The amount of capital that the firm raises via equity issuances in that year scaled
by the firm’s assets.
DEBT PROCEEDS The amount of capital that the firm raises via debt in that year scaled by the firm’s
assets.
INSIDER TRADING The insider trading figure for year t − 1 is the average insider insider sales (net of
purchases) for years t− 1 and t− 2 scaled by the firm’s revenue.
INSIDER HOLDING The average of all insider share holdings scaled by the total shares outstanding.
IND WC The industry average working capital accruals (current assets less current liabilities)
scaled by the total assets.
IND ALTMAN Z The industry average Altman (1968) Z score.
SUED An indicator that equals one if the firm was subject to a securities class action. The
data is from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC).
POSTSOX An indicator that equals one if the observation is after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (i.e. if the observation is in 2002 or later).
SHROWN The CEO’s percentage share ownership.
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Tables
Table 1: Sample Distribution by Year
This table contains the sample composition by year. We define overconfident CEOs as those for which HOLDER67 equals one
(HOLDER67 is defined in the variable appendix). We identify law suits using the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse
(SCAC).
Year #CEO #Overconfident CEO # Lawsuits filed #Overconfident CEO %Lawsuits involving
involved in lawsuits overconfident CEOs
1996 1125 505 14 9 64.286
1997 1135 578 38 29 76.316
1998 1183 676 57 46 80.702
1999 1234 720 93 65 69.892
2000 1300 742 105 78 74.286
2001 1355 786 129 98 75.969
2002 1339 746 124 81 65.323
2003 1384 715 119 81 68.067
2004 1419 763 111 73 65.766
2005 1395 803 87 52 59.770
2006 1378 796 76 46 60.526
2007 1398 798 104 63 60.577
2008 1509 805 99 53 53.535
2009 1498 731 71 37 52.113
2010 1475 691 73 37 50.685
2011 1417 676 48 23 47.917
2012 1329 631 27 17 62.963
Total 22873 12162 1375 888 64.582
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Table 3: Effect of CEO Overconfidence on Securities Class Actions
This table contains models that analyze the relationship between CEO overconfidence and likelihood of occurrence of a securities
class action (SCA). The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year t. “Holder67”
and “CEO180TradingOC” are two measures of CEO overconfidence. The appendix contains the variable definitions. All models
are LOGIT models that include industry and year fixed effects, and use standard errors clustered by firm. The significance levels
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
CEO Holder67 0.278***
[0.100]
CEO180TradingOC 0.386***
[0.121]
CEO180TradingOC (t-1) 0.296**
[0.143]
CEO180TradingOC (t-2) 0.373**
[0.170]
NYSE (t-1) -0.108 -0.106 -0.108 -0.110
[0.125] [0.125] [0.125] [0.125]
Ln(Assets) (t-1) 0.381*** 0.383*** 0.381*** 0.381***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.043] [0.044]
ROA (t-1) 0.527 0.635* 0.626* 0.628*
[0.349] [0.354] [0.353] [0.353]
Sales Growth (t-1) 1.236*** 1.289*** 1.292*** 1.288***
[0.213] [0.210] [0.210] [0.210]
R&D (t-1) 1.564 1.687* 1.675* 1.677*
[0.994] [0.997] [1.001] [1.004]
PP&E (t-1) -1.279*** -1.294*** -1.299*** -1.301***
[0.380] [0.380] [0.379] [0.380]
MB(t-1) 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Return (t-1) -6.162*** -5.842*** -5.834*** -5.867***
[1.321] [1.317] [1.322] [1.320]
Skewness of Return (t-1) -0.083 -0.084 -0.082 -0.083
[0.066] [0.066] [0.066] [0.066]
Std. Dev. of Return (t-1) 2.440** 2.284** 2.320** 2.328**
[1.119] [1.061] [1.075] [1.079]
Turnover (t-1) 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.096***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Institutional Holding (t-1) 0.202*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.206***
[0.067] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068]
Equity Proceeds (t-1) 1.774*** 1.823*** 1.806*** 1.800***
[0.513] [0.521] [0.519] [0.520]
Debt Proceeds (t-1) -0.064 -0.048 -0.047 -0.039
[0.234] [0.231] [0.233] [0.232]
Insider Trading (t-1) 0.092 0.119 0.107 0.113
[0.473] [0.474] [0.474] [0.474]
Insider Holding (t-1) -2.818* -2.773* -2.801* -2.802*
[1.513] [1.492] [1.493] [1.490]
IND WC (t-1) 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
[0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
IND ALTMAN-Z (t-1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,074 19,074 19,074 19,074
R-Squared 0.133 0.133 0.132 0.132
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Table 5: Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the relationship between CEO Overconfidence on
Securities Class Actions
This table contains models that analyze the effect on Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the relationship between CEO overconfidence
and likelihood of occurrence of a securities class action (SCAs). The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the
firm is subject to a SCA in year t. We define 1996 to 2002 as the pre-SOX period and 2003 to 2008 as the post-SOX period. We
define SOX-compliance firm as a firm that had 100% independent nominating committee, 100% independent audit committee
and majority independent board. The appendix contains the variable definitions. All models are LOGIT models that include
industry and year fixed effects, and use standard errors clustered by firm. The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are
denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
Sample All Compliant Non-Compliant
[1] [2] [3]
Holder67 0.501*** 0.393 0.538***
[0.173] [0.435] [0.202]
Holder67 × Post SOX -0.355* 0.430 -0.494**
[0.210] [0.526] [0.237]
Post SOX -0.089 0.470 -0.107
[0.360] [0.690] [0.391]
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,208 1,847 10,127
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.369 0.129
Difference between coefficient associated with “Holder67 × Post SOX” between compliant and non-compliant samples
χ2 value 3.50
P value 0.0613
Table 6: Effect of CEO overconfidence on the likelihood of success of Securities Class Actions
This table contains models that analyze conditional on there being a security class action, what is the likelihood that the
security class actions is successful. This sample has only sued firms in it; i.e., the sample of observations is associated with
a SCA. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year t and the SCA results
in a successful litigation in the future. “Holder67” and “CEO Trading-based-OC” are two measures of CEO overconfidence.
The appendix contains the variable definitions. All models are LOGIT models that include industry and year fixed effects,
and use standard errors clustered by firm. The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable Likelihood of success of a Securities Class Actions
[1] [2]
CEO Holder67 0.088
[0.236]
CEO 180TradingOC (t-2) 0.257
[0.408]
Controls Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 1,028 1028
Pseudo R-squared 0.170 0.170
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Table 7: CEO Overconfidence and Successful SCAs
This table contains models that replaces the security class action indicator with an indicator that equals one if the firm was
subject to a security class action that turns out to be successful and equal zero otherwise (i.e., either an unsuccessful SCA or
no SCA). The appendix contains the variable definitions. All models are LOGIT models that include industry and year fixed
effects, and use standard errors clustered by firm. The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *,
respectively.
Dependent Variable Successful SCA Indicator
CEO Holder67 0.299**
[0.152]
Controls Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 16588
Pseudo R-squared 0.0967
Table 8: CEO overconfidence and likelihood of future class actions
This table contains models that analyze the relationship between CEO overconfidence and repeat Security Class Actions. The dependent variable is
an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year t. “Holder67” and “CEOTradingOC” are two measures of CEO overconfidence.
The appendix contains the variable definitions. All models are LOGIT models that include industry and year fixed effects, and use standard errors
clustered by firm. The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Subsample Sued Before Never Sued Sued Before Never Sued
Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
CEO Holder67 -0.263 0.312**
[0.175] [0.126]
CEO 180TradingOC (t-4) -0.252 0.588*
[0.502] [0.335]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 882 13,896 857 12,904
Pseudo R-squared 0.132 0.103 0.119 0.103
Difference in CEO Holder67 (χ2) 7.01
Difference in CEO Holder67 (P val) 0.0081
Difference in CEO 180TradingOC(t-4) (χ2) 2.03
Difference in CEO 180TradingOC(t-4) (P val) 0.1583
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Table 9: Impact of SCAs on CEO confidence-level
This table contains models analyze the impact of a SCA on subsequent CEO CONFIDENCE. We define CONFIDENCE as the average value per
vested option scaled by the average strike price of the options. The average value per vested option is the total (estimated) value of all options
(Execucomp: ‘opt unex exer est val’) scaled by the total number of such options (Execucomp: ‘opt unex exer num’). The average strike price works
on the simplifying assumption that the options have call-like payoff-structures; and thus, the strike price (X) is X = S − (S − X), where S is the
prevailing stock price and we compute the value of the options (S − X) as the aforementioned average value per vested option that we use as the
numerator. All models control for the controls in Table 3. Panel A focuses on the impact of SCAs in general on subsequent confidence. Panel B
focuses on only the impact of the first SCA and omits observations that post-date that SCA. The regressions are OLS regressions. All models include
SIC two-digit industry effects and year effects. Brackets contain standard errors (based on standard errors clustered by firm) and superscripts ***,
**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable CEO Confidence (t)
Sub-sample Full Return(t) ≥ 0 Return(t-1) ≥ 0
Model [1] [2] [3]
Panel A: Impact of SCAs on confidence
SCA(t-1) -0.066 0.003 -0.008
[0.068] [0.130] [0.142]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,915 7,219 7,547
R-squared 0.205 0.285 0.235
Panel B: Focusing on first law suit only
In t-1, has had one suit but not two -0.145*** -0.177* -0.203**
[0.055] [0.091] [0.085]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,074 6,904 7,234
R-squared 0.208 0.290 0.238
Table 10: Confidence level of Newly Hired CEO
This table contains logit models that analyze whether the new CEO after a turnover event is overconfident. The sample is
cross-sectional and analyzes the overconfidence of the new CEO (measured in years t or t + 1) as a function of pre-turnover
characteristics in year t− 1 and in which the CEO in year t differs from that in year t− 1. We include only firm-year observations
in which there is a turnover. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the Holder67 measure of the new CEO computer
in year t immediately after the turnover where the CEO in year t differs from that in year t − 1. The Dependent variable in
Columns 3 and 4 is similar but computes the Holder67 measure in year t + 1. All models include SIC two-digit industry effects
and year effects. Brackets contain standard errors (based on standard errors clustered by firm) and superscripts ***, **, and *
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable Holder67 (t) Holder67 (t+1)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Prior CEO Sued -0.386* -0.378*
[0.203] [0.201]
Num SCAs Against Prior CEO -0.161** -0.158*
[0.080] [0.082]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,427 1,427 1,370 1,370
Pseudo R-squared 0.155 0.155 0.138 0.139
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Table 11: Robustness Test – Using Media-based Measures of Overconfidence
This table contains regressions that examine the likelihood of a SCA using media-based measures of CEO overconfidence. The
dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year t. The appendix contains the variable
definitions. All models are LOGIT models that include industry and year fixed effects, and use standard errors clustered by firm.
The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
NETNEWS(t-1) 0.107***
[0.038]
Controls Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 2986
Pseudo R-squared 0.161
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Table 12: Robustness test – Controlling for CEOs’ Compensation Contracts, Age, and Gov-
ernance
This table contains various models that test the relationship between CEO overconfidence and the likelihood of a security class
action. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a security class action in year t. The
appendix contains the variable definitions. All models are LOGIT models that include industry and year fixed effects, and use
standard errors clustered by firm. The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
Panel A: Option Intensity
CEO Holder67 0.257**
[0.102]
Option Intensity 0.305**
[0.155]
Controls Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 18,811
R-squared 0.143
Panel B: Wealth-Performance Sensitivity
CEO Holder67 0.250**
[0.120]
ln(WPS) -0.026
[0.045]
Controls Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 11,901
Pseudo R-squared 0.152
Panel C: CEO age
CEO Holder67 0.277***
[0.101]
Age -0.005
[0.007]
Controls Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 19,053
R-squared 0.141
Panel D: Anti-takeover provisions
CEO Holder67 0.215*
[0.112]
GINDEX -0.037
[0.024]
Controls Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 14,468
R-squared 0.152
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Table 13: Robustness Test – Removing Repeatedly Sued Firms from the Sample
This table contains models that analyze the relationship between CEO overconfidence and Securities Class Actions. The
dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year t. The appendix contains the variable
definitions. All models are LOGIT models that include industry and year fixed effects, and use standard errors clustered by firm.
The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
CEO HOLDER67(t-1) 0.286***
[0.104]
Controls Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 18954
Pseudo R-squared 0.133
Table 14: Robustness Test – CEO Overconfidence, Earnings Management and SCAs
This table contains models analyze the relationship between CEO overconfidence, accruals, and SCA-likelihood. The models are
logit models in which the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year t. We report
regression coefficients. The appendix contains the variable definitions. All models are LOGIT models that include industry and
year fixed effects, and use standard errors clustered by firm. The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***,
** and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
CEO Holder67 0.467***
[0.122]
ABS Discretionary Accruals 2.279***
[0.657]
CEO Holder67 × ABS Discretionary Accruals -0.950
[0.799]
Controls Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 16,091
R-squared 0.136
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Online Appendix
This online appendix reports additional results, including additional robustness tests. The
relevant tables are as follows.
• Table OA1 contains additional summary statistics for the sample.
• Table OA2 contains propensity score-based matching models.
• Table OA3 reports models that use a ‘residual’ measure of CEO overconfidence.
• Table OA4 analyzes the relationship between CEO overconfidence and stock return
volatility.
• Table OA5 assess the role of the firm’s stock return performance.
• Table OA6 examines the relationship between overconfidence and CEO age.
• Table OA7 reports results for linear probability models, which we estimate using OLS.
• Table OA8 reports results for models using firm-year clustering and Hoberg-Philips
industry classifications.
• Table OA9 contains FAS 123R effects on CEO overconfidence and litigation risk.
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Table OA2: Robustness Test – Propensity Score and Panel Models
This table contains models that ensure the results are robust to modeling technique. Columns 1-6 use different propensity score techniques. Columns
1-3 match firms with overconfident CEOs with firms with non-overconfident CEOs. Column 1 contains a first-stage regression that predicts the
likelihood that the firm has an overconfident CEO (as a function of firm-characteristics). Column 2 matches the control sample of non-overconfident
firms with the set of overconfident firms as follows. We obtain the set of propensity scores from Column 1. Next we construct a distribution of
propensity scores for the set of overconfident firms. Then we identify the 10th percentile cut-off. Finally, we estimate the regression (in Column 2)
omitting any non-overconfident firm whose propensity score lies below this 10th percentile cut-off. In Column 3, we undertake one-to-four nearest
neighbor matching. This functions by running the aforementioned first-stage model and obtaining the propensity scores from that model. The
second-stage then retains the treatment firm and the nearest four control firms (which have the smallest difference in propensity score with the
treatment firms). Columns 4-6 do a similar process but matching sued firms with non-sued firms. Column 7 contains a panel regression that uses
firm and year fixed effects. We report regression coefficients. Brackets contain standard errors (based on standard errors clustered by firm) and
superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent variable CEO
HOLDER67(t)
SCA Indicator SCA Indicator SCA Indicator
Regression Technique First
stage-Logit
Matched
sample.
Remove
lower 10%
by P-Score
Matched
sample.
1-to-4
nearest
distance
matching.
First
stage-Logit
Matched
sample.
Remove
lower 10%
by P-Score
Matched
sample.
1-to-4
nearest
distance
matching.
Panel
Regression
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
CEO HOLDER67(t-1) 0.359*** 0.368*** 0.293*** 0.268** 0.604***
[0.112] [0.111] [0.107] [0.113] [0.129]
NYSE(t-1) 0.199** 0.021 -0.058 -0.021 -0.085 -0.039
[0.093] [0.140] [0.139] [0.127] [0.135] [0.140]
LNASSET(t-1) -0.104*** 0.347*** 0.347*** 0.280*** 0.223*** 0.130*** 1.177***
[0.030] [0.049] [0.048] [0.042] [0.051] [0.045] [0.128]
WC(t-1) -0.019 -0.238 -0.147 -0.979** 0.094 0.676* -0.335
[0.266] [0.431] [0.418] [0.415] [0.409] [0.407] [0.513]
ROA(t-1) 1.623*** 0.233 0.139 0.671** 0.078 -0.196 0.887**
[0.330] [0.409] [0.344] [0.342] [0.308] [0.357] [0.435]
SALES GROWTH(t-1) 1.001*** 1.324*** 1.225*** 1.076*** 0.681*** 0.21 0.944***
[0.106] [0.241] [0.225] [0.176] [0.227] [0.220] [0.234]
R&D(t-1) 1.011 1.496 1.003 1.581* 0.311 -0.315 3.462**
[0.680] [1.045] [1.061] [0.895] [1.026] [1.021] [1.380]
GOODWILL(t-1) 0.778** -0.57 -0.625 -0.795 -0.443 0.15 0.12
[0.308] [0.517] [0.499] [0.500] [0.488] [0.492] [0.630]
PP&E(t-1) 0.343 -1.716*** -1.954*** -2.071*** -0.545 -0.125 -2.051**
[0.222] [0.474] [0.465] [0.392] [0.480] [0.481] [0.831]
ALTMAN Z(t-1) 0.047*** 0.017** 0.014** 0.022*** 0.008 0 0.035***
[0.012] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009]
MB(t-1) 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.037*** 0.013 0.060***
[0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.014]
RETURN(t-1) 5.625*** -10.618*** -10.671*** -9.820*** -6.410*** -1.974 -6.167***
[0.532] [1.623] [1.577] [1.499] [1.545] [1.442] [1.171]
SKEW(t-1) -0.032 -0.026 -0.027 -0.072 0.015 0.054 0.102*
[0.023] [0.078] [0.074] [0.073] [0.070] [0.071] [0.058]
RETURN STD DEV(t-1) 0.433 0.934 0.927 2.408** 0.547 -0.387 -1.932**
[0.396] [0.697] [0.688] [0.986] [0.691] [0.724] [0.935]
TURNOVER(t-1) 0.153*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.035* 0.075***
[0.023] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.026]
INST(t-1) 0.003 0.159** 0.173** 0.106* 0.140* 0.055 0.611***
[0.062] [0.074] [0.074] [0.059] [0.072] [0.073] [0.198]
EQUITY PROCCEEDS(t-1) 0.713 1.880*** 1.892*** 2.225*** 1.324*** 0.247 1.065
[0.447] [0.499] [0.471] [0.460] [0.436] [0.472] [0.672]
DEBT PROCCEEDS(t-1) 0.405** -0.123 -0.187 0.126 -0.082 -0.121 -0.303
[0.178] [0.267] [0.259] [0.235] [0.263] [0.272] [0.318]
INSIDER TRADING(t-1) 0.022 0.167 0.063 0.255 0.125 0.085 0.731**
[0.239] [0.487] [0.497] [0.463] [0.403] [0.358] [0.338]
INSIDER HOLDING(t-1) 1.334** -2.596* -2.038 -2.13 -0.904 -0.525 -3.466**
[0.635] [1.450] [1.502] [1.342] [1.441] [1.346] [1.387]
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No No No No Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.075 0.153 0.151 0.095 0.094 0.076 4230
Observations 16178 13924 15153 16958 11537 4074 407
3
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Table OA3: Robustness Test – Residual Measure of Overconfidence
This table contains regressions that examine the likelihood of a SCA using a Holder67 ‘residual’ measure of overconfidence. We
define the Residual CEO HOLDER67 (t-1) variable as the residual from the regression CEO HOLDER67 (t-1) = α + βRETURN
(t-1) + ε. The models are logit models in which the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a
SCA in year t. We report regression coefficients. Brackets contain standard errors (based on standard errors clustered by firm)
and superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent variable SCA Indicator
Residual CEO HOLDER67(t-1) 0.181*
[0.098]
Controls Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 18958
Pseudo R-squared 0.134
Table OA4: Online Appendix – Interaction of Overconfidence and Riskiness of the firm
This table contains logit models that include the interaction of the Holder67 variable with the firm’s stock return volatility. All
models include SIC two-digit industry effects and year effects. All models are LOGIT models that include industry and year
fixed effects, and use standard errors clustered by firm. The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, **
and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
Holder67 0.360**
[0.171]
Holder67 × Std Dev of Return(t-1) -0.478
[1.186]
Std Dev of Return(t-1) 2.373**
[1.159]
Controls Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 18,715
R-Squared 0.131
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Table OA5: Robustness Test – Interaction of CEO Overconfidence, with Stock Returns
This table contains models analyze the relationship between CEO overconfidence, prior returns, and SCA-likelihood. The models
are logit models in which the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year t. We
report regression coefficients. The models contain the set of control variables in Table 3. All models include SIC two-digit
industry effects and year effects. Brackets contain standard errors (based on standard errors clustered by firm) and superscripts
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
Panel A: Past-year return
CEO Holder67 0.334***
[0.104]
Return(t-1) -7.768***
[2.184]
CEO Holder67 × Return(t-1) 3.594
[2.405]
Controls Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 18,715
Pseudo R-squared 0.132
Panel B: Negative Return Indicator
CEO Holder67 0.478***
[0.152]
Negative Return (t-1) 0.592***
[0.168]
CEO Holder67 x Negative Return(t-1) -0.280
[0.198]
Controls Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 18,715
R-squared 0.132
5
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436264 
Table OA6: Robustness Test – Interaction of CEO Overconfidence with CEO Age
This table contains models that analyze the relationship between CEO overconfidence, CEO age, and securities class actions.
Panels A and B analyze young CEOs and old CEOs (young CEOs being those whose age is in the bottom half of the sample;
conversely for old CEOs). All models include SIC two-digit industry effects and year effects. All models are LOGIT models that
include industry and year fixed effects, and use standard errors clustered by firm. The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA indicator
Panel A: Young CEOs
Holder67 0.231*
[0.136]
Controls Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 10,013
Pseudo R-squared 0.120
Panel B: Old CEOs
Holder67 0.414**
[0.168]
Controls Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 8,277
Pseudo R-squared 0.175
Table OA7: Robustness Test – Using Linear Probability Models
This table contains linear probability models (as opposed to logit models), which we estimate using an OLS regression. The re-
gressions are OLS regressions. All models include SIC two-digit industry effects and year effects. Brackets contain standard errors
(based on standard errors clustered by firm) and superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA indicator
Holder67 0.015***
[0.005]
Controls Yes
Year fixed effect Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes
Observations 19,354
R-squared 0.067
6
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Table OA8: Effect of CEO Overconfidence on SCAs using Double Clustering and H-P Clas-
sification
This table contains models that analyze the relationship between CEO overconfidence and likelihood of occurrence of a securities
class action (SCAs). The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year t. “Holder67”
and “CEOTradingOC” are two measures of CEO overconfidence. The appendix contains the variable definitions. All models are
LOGIT models that include Hoberg-Phillips Indistry and year fixed effects, and use double standard errors clustered by firm
and year. The significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
Model [1] [2]
Holder67 0.262***
[0.069]
CEO trading measure (raw returns) -0.475***
[0.071]
Controls Yes Yes
Hoberg-Phillips Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 18,722 9,792
Pseudo R-Squared 0.151 0.188
7
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436264 
Table OA9: FAS 123R, CEO overconfidence, and SCAs
This table contains models that examine the role of FAS 123R in moderating the impact of CEO overconfidence on SCAs. The
models are logit models in which the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the firm is subject to a SCA in year
t. The models include control variables from Table 3. We interact the Holder67 CEO overconfidence measure with a post FAS
indicator (that equals one if the observation post-dates 2005). We split the sample into high option intensity and low option
intensity sub-samples, where we define option intensity as the proportion of total compensation (Execucomp: tdc1) that comes
from option grants. We report regression coefficients. Brackets contain standard errors (based on standard errors clustered by
firm) and superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable SCA Indicator
Panel A: HIGH option intensity (>p75)
CEO Holder67(t-1) 0.617***
[0.182]
CEO Holder67(t-1) × Post FAS -0.606**
[0.270]
Post FAS -0.169
[0.242]
Observations 4630
Pseudo R-squared 0.089
Panel B: LOW option intensity(< p75)
CEO Holder67(t-1) 0.298*
[0.164]
CEO Holder67(t-1) × Post FAS 0.000
[0.216]
Post FAS -0.716***
[0.180]
Controls Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 13,897
Pseudo R-squared 0.158
8
